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PUBLISH OR PERISH: THE DESTINY OF
APPELLATE OPINIONS IN CALIFORNIA
Each year California appellate courts write numerous opin-
ions which could be of inestimable value to practicing attorneys
in litigation. However, since these opinions never appear in the
official reports as a result of the court of appeal's determination
that they do not merit publication,' only a small number of law-
yers will ever learn of these cases, and even fewer will actually
read or use the decisions.
A typical example is Ball v. Tobeler.2 In this case, plaintiff
tenants, in a class action, alleged that the defendant landlord had
continuously failed to maintain his apartments in accordance with
various governmental health codes, and consequently that the
apartments had no rental value. As a result thereof, the plain-
tiffs alleged that they had in fact been damaged to the extent of
the rent paid over the two previous years. They sought declara-
tory relief and injunctive relief based, respectively, on a theory of
implied warranty of habitability,8 and an allegation that the de-
fendant landlord was in violation of an unfair business competi-
tion statute.4 As to the first claim of relief, the court of appeal
declared that it was error to sustain a general demurrer to this
cause of action; as to the second, the court held that "the sweep-
ing language of [the unfair competition statute] embraces the
unlawful practice of a landlord" in the complaint.5
If published, the Ball opinion could markedly affect future
landlord-tenant litigation, since the case expanded tenants' rem-
edies for improperly maintained housing. As an unreported de-
cision, however, its status will be diluted considerably.
The majority of appellate opinions, like Ball, remain un-
published because of California's policy of "selective publication,"6
1. CAL. R. CT. 976 (West 1973).
2. 2 Civil No. 38424 (Cal. Ct. App., 2nd Dist., Div. 3, filed September 13,
1972), hearing den., November 9, 1972 [hereinafter cited as "Ball v. Tobeler"];
see generally, Comment, Hinson v. Delis: California Adopts the Implied War-
ranty of Habitability, 24 HAST. L.J. 369, 377-8 (1973).
3. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1967): "2. Any person performing . . .
an act of unfair competition within the state may be enjoined in any court of
competent jurisdiction . . . 3. [u]nfair competition shall mean and include
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice ..
5. Ball v. Tobeler at 20.
6. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF CAL. COURTS 75 (1972). See Note, Selective Publication of Case
Law, 39 So. CAL. L. REV. 608 (1966).
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which spares the legal profession the time and expense of pur-
chasing, storing, and researching the huge number of superflu-
ous opinions that are handed down each year. Repeatedly, how-
ever, important substantive decisions are nevertheless cast aside
with the unpublishables. 7  The result is that attorneys are, in ef-
fect, denied access to valuable judicial precedent, since it is vir-
tually impossible to find a case which is nowhere reported, di-
gested, annotated, or indexed. With few exceptions, a written
opinion is relegated to effective obscurity unless it is certified for
publication by the court.
The standards and criteria pertaining to selective publica-
tion of written appellate opinions in California and the feasibility
of employing the writ of mandate as one possible remedy to com-
pel the publication of such meritorious opinions8 will be examined
in the materials to follow.
SELECTIVE PUBLICATION
Background
The requirement of written judicial opinions in California9
dates back to an 1850 statute'0 which ordered the supreme court
to publish all its opinions in writing. Nine years later, the court
struck down that provision, deciding that henceforth it should be
within the court's discretion whether or not to issue an opinion
after judgment, and if so, whether such opinions would be oral
or written." The supreme court based its decision primarily
on the grounds that the legislature was meddling in judicial affairs
by imposing on the court a requirement of compulsory publication.
The requirement of written opinions was reinstated in 1879,12
this time under the authority of the California Constitution. The
Constitutional Convention's rationale was based on the fact that
the judicial opinions of the supreme court become part of the
settled law of the state and precedents for subsequent cases. For
these precedents to have value as law, the supreme court must
state the grounds for its decisions in writing. Further, it was
7. See note 41 and accompanying text, infra.
8. E.g., Ball v. Tobeler.
9. An extensive history of the publication of written judicial opinions in
California is presented in Seligson and Warnlof, The Use of Unreported Cases
in California, 24 HAST. L.J. 39-45 (1972) [hereinafter cited as "Seligson and
Warnlof"].
10. Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 90. See Seligson and Warnlof 39; Strauss,
Written Opinions, 39 CAL. ST. B.J. 127 (1964).
11. Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24 (1859). See also Radin, The Require-
ment of Written Opinions, 18 CAL. L. REv. 486 (1930); Seligson and Warnlof
39-40.
12. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1879).
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believed that such a requirement would result in well-considered
opinions, and would tend to develop purity and honesty in the ad-
ministration of justice.13  When the California courts of appeal
were created in 1904,14 a similar requirement of publication was
made applicable to them. The practice of publishing all supreme
court and appellate decisions was continued until 1963.
The advent of the 1960's, however, witnessed mounting
criticism within the legal profession directed at the rapidly in-
creasing bulk of reported opinions, 15 many of which covered set-
tled law and lacked any value as precedent. The number of vol-
umes of law reporters relative to reported decisions grew even
faster, since many opinions were published in more than one re-
porter.10 As a result, law libraries were necessarily growing at a
frenetic pace, and practicing attorneys were spending more money
than ever to keep their collections of reporters current.
The practice of publishing every appellate court opinion
was subject to scathing denunciation by critics who believed that
the primary duty of the courts was settling private disputes
rather than developing substantive law.17  According to these
commentators, there was no reason for an opinion to go beyond
the parties of the case, especially if the opinion invoked no new
point of law, proceeded on settled principles, or based its hold-
ing upon a commonplace factual situation.' 8 The basic fallacy,
it was contended, was the assumption that merely because an opin-
ion was in writing it should be made part of the law of the state
forever.' 9
Present Standards for Publication of Opinions
The California State Bar and the Judicial Council recognized
the problem created by the plethora of non-essential reported de-
13. See Strauss, supra note 10, at 128; Radin, supra note 11, at 486-87.
14. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (1904).
15. Prince, Law Books, Unlimited, 48 AM. B. ASS'N. J. 134 (1962). For
example, from 1790-1840, there were 50,000 reported decisions in the U.S. That
figure grew to 450,000 from 1840-1890, and to 1,250,000 between 1890-1940.
By 1962, American printed decisions numbered about 24 million per year.
See generally, Kelso, Does the Law Need a Technological Revolution?, 18 RocKY
MT. L. REv. 378-79 (1946).
16. For example, California Supreme Court opinions are published in the
official California Reports, and West's Pacific Reporter and California Reporter.
California Court of Appeal decisions are published in the official California
Appellate Reports, and West's California Reporter. Further, decisions of both
courts are noted in digests, citators, texts, law reviews, and annotations.
17. Prince, supra note 15, at 135.
18. See Flavin, Decisions and Opinions for Publication, 12 SYRACsE L.
REV. 142 (1960).
19. Prince, supra note 15, at 135.
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cisions and concluded that the publication of all court of appeal
decisions was no longer desirable, 20 and that a policy of selective
publication would be the best solution for the problem.
In accordance with this policy, the California legislature
in 1963 adopted an act providing that "[s]uch opinions of the
supreme court, of the courts of appeal, and of the appellate de-
partments of the superior courts as the supreme court may deem
expedient shall be published in the official reports."'" The leg-
islature's role in the scheme of publication was enunciated in the
constitutional revision of 1966: "The legislature shall provide
for the prompt publication of such opinions of the supreme court
and the courts of appeal as the supreme court deems appropriate,
and those opinions shall be available for publication by any per-
son."
22
Thus, only appellate opinions which the supreme court "deems
appropriate" will be published, and "any person" may have access
only to those opinions made available for publication. It ap-
pears, therefore, that an appellate opinion may not be published
privately 23 unless it first is "deemed appropriate" by the Cali-
fornia supreme court for inclusion in the official reports.24
In order to carry out the legislative mandate implicit in arti-
cle VI, section 4 of the California Constitution,25 the supreme court
in 1964 adopted California Rule of Court 976.26 This rule de-
clares that all supreme court opinions shall be published in the of-
ficial reports, and sets the standards for publication of lower court
opinions. According to the criteria of publishability set forth
by Rule 976,28 no opinions of a court of appeal or of an appel-
late department of the superior court shall be published unless
one of the following criteria is satisfied:
20. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF CAL. COURTS 21 (1963).
21. Cal. Stats. ch. 1353 (1963) now codified in CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68905
(West Supp. 1973) (formerly § 68895).
22. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (West 1972).
23. E.g., West's California Reporter or Pacific Reports.
24. See note 60 and accompanying text, infra. Prof. Seligson and Mr.
Warnlof, however, do not appear to recognize this point of view. Indeed, they
hypothesize a situation where an "enterprising entrepreneur" may defeat the
benefit of Rule 976 by commercially publishing unreported cases. Seligson
and Warnlof 52.
25. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (West 1972).
26. CAL. R. CT. 976 (1964).
27. CAL. R. CT. 976 (West 1973). See Note, Selective Publication of Case
Law, 39 So. CAL. L. REv. 608 (1966); Seligson and Warnlof 45-6.
28. Rule 976(b) originally provided for publication if the opinion involved
"a new and important issue of law, a change in an established principle of law,
or a matter of general public interest." The 1972 revision made the present
criteria of the rule more specific, and added explanatory footnotes.
1973]
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1) the opinion establishes a new rule of law or alters or
modifies an existing rule. "This criterion calls for publication of
the relatively few opinions that establish new rules of law, includ-
ing a new construction of a statute, or [a] change [in] existing
rules [of law]."129  Publication, however, is not justified if an es-
tablished rule or principle is merely applied to a substantially new
factual situation.
2) the opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public
interest. This requires that the legal issue, and not merely the
factual case or controversy, be of public interest. "Public inter-
est" does not mean "public curiosity," but is defined as an inter-
est of a continuing, and not merely transitory, nature. This re-
quirement is satisfied if the legal issue is of continuing interest to
a substantial public group, i.e. public officers, agencies or en-
tities, members of an economic class, or a business or professional
group."0 This criterion also includes opinions that clarify "a
controlling rule of law that is not well established or clearly
stated in prior reported opinions," those which reconcile conflict-
ing authorities, or those which test "the present validity of a set-
tled principle in the light of modem authorities elsewhere,"'" pro-
vided, of course, that the requirement of continuing public inter-
est is satisfied.
3) the opinion criticizes existing law. "This criterion wouldjustify publication of the rare intermediate appellate opinion
which finds fault with existing common law or statutory prin-
ciples and doctrines and which recommends changes by a higher
court or by the legislature."82
The Certification Process
Originally, Rule 976(c) 8 was slanted in favor of publica-
tion of appellate opinions, although the ultimate determination of
publishability rested in the hands of the court which decided the
case. Every state appellate court's opinion was "deemed" to meet
the standard, and was published unless a majority of the court
rendering the opinion certified that it did not meet the standard,
and specified that it not be published. 4
As revised in 1972, however, the certification process has
been inverted, and an opinion is presently published only if "a ma-




33. CAL. R. Cr. 976(c) (1964).
34. CAL. R. CT. 976 (1964). See 6 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE(2d ed.), Appeal § 508, at 4459 (1971).
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jority of the court rendering the opinion certifies prior to the de-
cision becoming final in that court that it meets the standard." 5
An opinion is now deemed "unpublishable" until "certified for
publication." The supreme court has retained some supervisory
power over the publication of appellate opinions, since an opin-
ion not certified for publication by the court of appeal "shall nev-
ertheless be published in the Official Reports upon" the highest
court's order.86  This provision also applies to the appellate
departments of the superior court.
Rule 976 further provides that "no opinion superseded by
the granting of a hearing, rehearing or other judicial action shall
be published in the Official Reports, 8 7 and details the procedure
to be followed after an opinion is certified for publication."8
The selective publication system adopted by the California
courts has been a quantitative success. Of the 3746 majority
opinions written by the courts of appeal in 1970-71, 71 % were not
certified for publication, a 10% rise over that of 1969-70.1
CRITICISMS OF SELECTIVE PUBLICATION
The Role of Judicial Discretion
A closer examination of the statistics compiled during 1970-
71 by the Judicial Council4° shows a significant disparity in
the application of Rule 976 among the individual divisions of the
appellate court districts. For example, division one of the First
Appellate District was consistently below the state average (71% )
in terms of the percentage of majority opinions unpublished (to-
tal opinions unpublished 56%--civil appeals 57%, criminal ap-
peals 61%, original proceedings 17%), while division two of the
Fourth Appellate District was just as consistently above average in
35. CAL. R. Cr. 976(c) (West 1973).
36. Id.
37. Id.(d).
38. ld.(e): "Written opinions of the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal,
and appellate departments of the superior courts shall be filed with the clerks of
the respective courts. Two copies of each opinion of the Supreme Court and two
copies of each opinion of a Court of Appeal or of an appellate department of a
superior court which the court has certified as meeting the standard for publica-
tion specified in subdivision (b) shall be furnished by the clerk to the Reporter
of Decisions. The Reporter of Decisions shall edit the opinions for publication
as directed by the Supreme Court. Proof sheets of each opinion in the type to
be used in printing the reports shall be submitted by the Reporter of Decisions
to the court which prepared the opinion for examination, correction, and final
approval."
39. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 76. The REPORT further points out
that the 2657 opinions not published during 1970-71 were greater in number
than the 2371 majority opinions written in 1966-67, and "represents a large
savings in the number of printed volumes of California Appellate Reports."
40. Id.
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each category (total 80%-civil appeals 78%, criminal appeals
85%, original proceedings 67%).
Even assuming variances in the number and type of cases
decided by each division,42 it is difficult to avoid the obvious
conclusion that the standards for publication administered through-
out the state are applied in a manner which is something less than
uniform.
This situation is certainly not surprising, since the applica-
tion of Rule 976 is entrusted to the discretion of the very judges
who decide the cases and author the opinions. It has been sug-
gested that judges are guided by criteria extrinsic to those of Rule
976 when they consider whether or not a particular opinion should
be certified for publication:
When the author of an opinion thinks that all the world
should have the opportunity to read his brilliant dissertation,
it is a touchy matter for his two colleagues to decide that the
opinion does not merit publication under the rules.43
If indeed it is true that a judge can exert pressure to publish
an opinion which meets none of the three criteria of Rule 976,
there is no reason to believe that the converse situation is not
41. Id. at 75.
CALIFORNIA COURTS OF APPEALPERCENTAGE OF MAJORITY OPINIONS UNPUBLISHED
Fiscal Year 1970-71
I Civil Criminal Original
Courts of Appeal Total appeals appeals proceedings
State total 71 62 82 41
District I . 70 65 81 40
Division 1 56 57 61 17
Division 2 ---- 69 63 60 33Division 3 ---.........-------------- 75 68 89 46
Division 4 --- ......... 78 74 89 53
District II -........------------------- 73 59 85 81
Division 1 75 59 88 50Division 2 ......................- 68 54 81 71Division 3 . 86 72 95 38Division 4 70 60 81 8Division 5 -.- .......... 65 48 79 21
District 1I. 71 65 83 55
District IV 72 69 79 56
Division 1 63 58 72 41
Division 2 80 78 85 67
D istrict V ...............................- 59 47 74 20
42. Unfortunately, the Judicial Council Report does not report the number
of cases transacted by division, but by district. See Id. at 91-3.
43. Gustafson, Some Observations About California Courts of Appeal, 19
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 204 n.127 (1971).
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true: namely, that a judge may write an opinion which squarely
meets one or more of the criteria, and yet will pressure his col-
leagues not to certify.44
Although the courts of appeal almost never discuss the ap-
plicability of an opinion to the standards of Rule 976, a rare ex-
ception is found in People v. Welborn." In that case, the court
admitted that the appeal involved "no new or important issue
of law and changes no established principle of law" '4 but never-
theless deemed the opinion publishable under Rule 976 because the
point raised on appeal illustrated ". . . an intelligent, pain-
staking and too infrequently invoked use by the trial judge of his
power to make jury instructions more meaningful by fitting them to
the specific facts."' 47  The court seems to have liberally exercised
its discretionary power to publish, while inferring that the case
may not squarely meet the criteria set forth in Rule 976(b). 48
The problem seems to lie in the fact that the determination
of publishability of a particular opinion is made by the same per-
sons responsible for creating that opinion. It appears that sub-
jective factors extrinsic to Rule 976 can creep into the exercise
of judicial discretion as to certification for publication, resulting
in a non-uniform practice of selective publication throughout
California.49
The Precedent Value of Unpublished Opinions
California has long recognized the precedent value of unre-
ported opinions,50 provided they have not been superseded by
subsequent reported opinions.5' The courts have cited such
cases with approval, 52 and have employed them as controlling
44. For example, although the opinion may squarely meet the criteria for
publication, a judge may desire the anonymity inherent in non-publication be-
cause he fears reversal, is unwilling to extend his holding beyond the facts of
the instant case, or fears that his reasoning may be unsound and subject to
criticism.
45. 242 Cal. App. 2d 668, 51 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1966). Cf. People v. Adler,
25 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 24 at 41, 101 Cal. Rptr. 726 at 737-8 (1972) (dissent of
Judge Goldberg).
46. id. at 671, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
47. Id.
48. Admittedly, Rule 976 was more general in 1966 (when Welborn was
decided) than it is as a result of the 1972 revision. See note 28, supra.
49. See note 41, supra.
50. Seligson and Warnlof 47-50.
51. "The fact that [a] case was not ordered reported in the official reports
cannot be taken to indicate ... that this court disapproved the doctrine an-
nounced therein." MacDonald v. MacDonald, 155 Cal. 665, 672, 102 P. 927,
930 (1909). See also Estate of Little, 23 Cal. App. 2d 40, 43, 72 P.2d 213,
215 (1937).
52. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Knight, 74 Cal. 432, 16 P. 235 (1887); Santa Ana
19731
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with respect to the legal issues decided therein. 8
However, the silence of Rule 976 as to the precedent value
of unreported cases has caused distress to at least one commen-
tator who sees the situation as "[o]ne of the unsettled questions in
the operation of the selective publication system."54  The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in denying petitions for rehearings, has re-
cently directed the Reporter of Decisions not to publish appel-
late opinions which cite unpublished opinions. 5 The apparent
reason for this practice is that while the court approved the result
in the case, it "disagreed with or had reservations about the rea-
soning for the decision and chose this course of action to remove
the opinion as precedent."5 6
The courts of appeal have actually indicated in at least two
cases57 that "it is improper to cite as precedent an opinion of the
court of appeal which has been certified for non-publication pur-
suant to Rule 976." '' S
Although fewer case decisions are now published under se-
lective publication, some commentators59 advocate further mea-
sures to decrease the volume of published cases by removing the
incentive to publish uncertified cases. They argue that if courts
no longer accept unpublished opinions as precedent, unofficial
reporters will be eliminated,6 and the value of unreported cases
will be severely undermined. 61 Such cases, except to the extent
v. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538, 34 P. 224 (1893); Gray v. La Societe Francaise, 131
Cal. 566, 63 P. 848 (1901).
53. See, e.g., Puterbagh v. Wadham, 162 Cal. 611, 123 P. 804 (1912);
Foley v. Martin, 142 Cal. 256, 71 P. 165 (1904); Smith v. Martin, 135 Cal. 247,
67 P. 779 (1901).
54. 6 B. Wrrgn, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE (2d ed.), Appeal § 509, at 4460
(1971).
55. People v. Bowling, 2d Crim. No. 21296 (Sup. Ct., filed May 3, 1972),
in The Recorder, May 8, 1972, at 6, 7, accord, People v. Gomez, 26 Cal. App.
3d 928, 930-31, 103 Cal. Rptr. 453, 454 (1972), where the court, referring to
an unpublished opinion cited by respondent, noted that the "Supreme Court, how-
ever, while denying hearing in [that case], has directed that it not be published
in the official appellate reports .... [The case] is thus not of precedential
value here."
56. Seligson and Warnlof 48-9.
57. People v. Cobb, 15 Cal. App. 3d 1, 93 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1971); Web
Service Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 7, 51 Cal. Rptr. 753
(1966).
58. People v. Cobb, 15 Cal. App. 3d 1, 3 n.1, 93 Cal. Rptr. 152, 154 n.1
(1971). (Certification for non-publication was the rule prior to the 1972 revision.
See text accompanying note 34, supra.)
59. See Prince, supra note 15, at 37; Seligson and Warnlof 51-4.
60. In essence, this has already been achieved in California, since only
those opinions "deemed appropriate" or certified for publication by the Supreme
Court "shall be available for publication by any person." CAL. CONST. art.
VI, § 14; CAL. R. Cr. 976.
61. Prince, supra note 15, at 136. See Committee on Legal Publications and
Decisions, 37 CAL. ST. B.J. 377 (1962).
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they affect the parties involved, would thus be relegated to imme-
diate and deserved obscurity. Factors such as judicial economy,
fairness, reliability and efficiency are cited to support the proposi-
tion that unreported cases should be stripped of their value as
precedent .62
62. Seligson and Warnlof 51-4. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently adopted a "no publish, no precedent" rule, 9TH Cut.
R. 21, 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. April 1973):
FORM AND PUBLICATION OF DISPOSITION OF CASES
(a) Opinions, Memoranda, Orders; Publication. A written rea-
soned disposition of a case which is intended for publication is an
OPINION of the Court. It may be an authored opinion or a per
curiam opinion. A written reasoned disposition of a case which is not
intended for publication is a MEMORANDUM. Any other disposition
of a matter before the Court is an ORDER.
PUBLICATION means making available for reporting by legal
publishing companies, or for distribution to regular subscribers, written
dispositions which have been printed as slip opinions, or copies of
which have been prepared by any other means. Publication as a matter
of course shall apply only to opinions.
(b) When Disposition to be by Opinion. Subject to subsection
(d) hereof, a case shall not be disposed of by written opinion for
publication unless it:
(1) Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule or law, or
(2) Calls attention to a rule of law which appears to have
been generally overlooked, or
(3) Criticizes existing law, or(4) Involves a legal or factual issue of unique interest or
substantial public importance, or
(5) Relies in whole or in part upon a reported opinion in
the case by a district court or an administrative agency, or
(6) Is accompanied by a separate concurring or dissenting
expression, and the author of such separate expression desires that
it be reported or distributed to regular subscribers.
(c) Dispositions as Precedent. A disposition which is not for
publication will not be regarded as precedent in this Court and shall
not be cited to this Court in briefs or oral argument; Provided, any
disposition of this Court may be referred to on the question of whether
such disposition establishes the defense of res judicata or collateral es-
toppel or establishes the law of the case.
(d) Designation for Publication. A disposition other than an
opinion may be specially designated by a majority of the judges acting
for publication and when so published may be used for any purpose
for which an opinion may be used. Such a designation should be indi-
cated at the end of the disposition when filed with the clerk by the
addition of the words "For Publication" on a separate line.
(e) Preliminary Determination to Publish. The preliminary
determination whether the disposition should be published should be
made at the first conference following oral argument, or if the disposi-
tion is made without oral argument, before it is filed with the clerk.
Note that this rule differs from the California Rule 976 in one important
aspect: the 9th Circuit allows any decision which is accompanied by a dissent
or concurring opinion to be published. While such an addition would certainly
liberalize California's Rule 976, it would still not solve the problem posed by a
decision such as Ball v. Tobeler, which was a unanimous decision.
Additionally, the 9th Circuit allows decisions of "legal or factual issues of
unique interest or substantial public importance" to be published. This is indeed
more liberal than California's Rule 976, which limits publishable decisions to
those which involve only legal issues of continuing public interest, and dis-
tinguishes "public interest" from mere public curiosity. See note 30 and ac-
companying text, supra.
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Such a proposal seems well suited to the typical case which
does not meet the criteria of Rule 976(b) and is therefore not
published. The problem, however, is that meritorious opinions
which should be published under Rule 976(b) are repeatedly
deemed unpublishable either through judicial indiscretion or non-
uniform application of the rule."' As a result, an opinion
which should be accorded the precedent value that publication in
the official reports requires is nevertheless cast aside as worth-
less.
This situation is seemingly intolerable in a legal system
based on stare decisis. While the most immediate function of a
judicial opinion is to explain the disposition of a case to the par-
ties and their counsel, a more generalized function is to achieve
predictability in law "so that expectations based on knowledge
of the law may be justified and justified expectations be realized."64
Precedents are not the ultimate sources of the law, for back of
them are basic juridical concepts as well as habits of life and so-
cietal institutions. "None the less, in a system so highly developed
as our own, precedents have so covered the ground that they fix
the point of departure from which the labor of the judge begins."65
Exiling valuable "points of departure" into oblivion by means
of the non-uniform and indiscreet operation of selective publica-
tion can only hinder the work of both judge and counsel.
Denial of Public Access to Judicial Opinions
To a trial attorney, the most serious criticism of California's
63. Witkin points out that although the precedent value of unreported opin-
ions is questionable, "if the criteria for publication are strictly followed, [unpub-
lished opinions] are unlikely to be useful as precedents." 6 B. WlTrIN, CAL-
IFORNIA PROCEDURE (2d ed.), Appeal § 663, at 4578 (1971) (emphasis
added).
This statment, in a nutshell, sets forth the basic policy behind Rule 976,
i.e. to restrict the publication of decisions which are not likely to be useful as
future precedent. Under this rule, however, it is obvious that meritorious cases
may not be certified for publication either because the judges apply the criteria
for publishability inconsistently, or because the very criteria themselves are
overly restrictive. The latter aspect of the problem at hand may be remedied
by broadening the criteria, or repealing Rule 976 entirely and reinstating the
policy of publishing all opinions. In the long run, there is no doubt that the
latter course would be the most fair, reliable and efficient (albeit the most ex-
pensive) as well as most consistent with traditional notions of stare decisis. See
note 74, infra.
Given, however, the expressed desire of the legal profession to preserve by
publication for future reference only those opinions which by some criteria are
arguably worth preserving, we proceed on the assumption that a policy of selec-
tive publication as exemplified by Rule 976 can be a workable concept. But
it can only be so if it operates in such a manner as to bring about the result
suggested by Witkin, supra. Otherwise, perhaps we are sacrificing stare decisis
for the sake of mere economic considerations.
64. R.A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 Co-
LUMBIA L. REV. 810, 811 (1961).
65. B.N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1920).
[Vol.. 13
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selective publication rule is that members of the legal profession
as well as the public at large are being denied free access to the
opinions of courts.
The right of access to judicial opinions is by no means a new
concept, having been first enunciated by the highest court of
Massachusetts in Nash v. Lathrop.66 It has been confirmed by
the United States Supreme Court 67 and several state courts as well.
68
The right is clearly delineated by the Nash court, which found
that
[t]he decisions and opinions of the justices are the author-
ized exposition and interpretations of the laws, which are
binding upon all the citizens. They declare the unwritten
law, and construe and declare the meaning of the statutes.
Every citizen is presumed to know the law thus declared, and
it needs no argument to show that justice requires that all
should have free access to the opinions, and that it is against
sound public policy to prevent this, or to suppress and keep
from the earliest knowledge of the public the statutes, or the
decisions and opinions of the justices.6 9
The Nash court reasoned that since state judicial opinions are on
essentially the same footing as statutes, 70 and since the legisla-
ture could hardly pass laws without making them public, neither,
therefore, could the courts of the state. 7 '
It seems reasonable that if the general public has the same
right of access to judicial opinions as it has to state laws, then at-
torneys must have an even greater right by virtue of their profes-
sion. Indeed, support for such a view has been expressed in at
least one federal case: 72
In a system of law based on stare decisis it is not enough that
opinions of the court be available only to litigants and their
counsel. It is essential that such opinions be readily ac-
cessible to the legal profession generally and to the courts
for purposes of research, citation and general development of
66. 142 Mass. 29, 6 N.E. 559 (1886).
67. Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
68. Banks v. West Publ. Co., 27 F. 50, 51 (C.C. Minn. 1886); Banks v.
Manchester, 23 F. 143, 145 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1885); State ex rel. Journal Co. v.
County Ct. for Racine County, 43 Wis. 2d 297, 304, 168 N.W.2d 836, 843 (1969);
New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 2 N.Y.2d 677, 684, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409, 414,
143 N.E.2d 256, 259 (1957); Ex parte Brown, 166 Ind. 593, 599, 78 N.E. 553,
559 (1906).
69. Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. at 31, 6 N.E. at 560 (1886).
70. The U.S. Supreme Court accepted this proposition in Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
71. Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. at 31, 6 N.E. at 560 (1886).
72. Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 297 F.2d
526 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 369 U.S. 871 (1962).
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the law, as well as to others who may wish to refer to
them.78
Under a system of selective publication applied as non-uni-
formly as California's, whenever a case which contributes signifi-
cantly to the development of the law is denied publication, an at-
torney may be precluded from effectively assisting a client simply
because that element of the law is unavailable for reference.
Such a process denies attorneys the benefits of stare decisis, 74
which would have been readily available had publication been per-
mitted.
The California selective publication system further provides
that if the state does not publish an opinion in the official reports,
neither, it appears, may it be published privately.75 This view
is not only in direct conflict with Nash and its subsequent line of
cases, 70 but also with the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Banks v. Manchester,77 which concluded that "[t]he whole
work done by judges constitutes the authentic exposition and
interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for
publication to all."'78  Additionally, it has long been held in the
United States that judicial opinions are not the property of the
state merely because it pays the salaries of the judges. Instead,
they belong to the people in the same way that state laws belong
to the citizens of the states. 79  Therefore, although the state re-
porter of decisions has the exclusive right to edit and publish the
official reports, 0 he has no right to suppress the opinions of the
justices before they appear in the official reports.8 ' He does,
however, possess the right as well as the duty to control by rea-
73. Id. at 143.
74. In a leading case, the California Supreme Court has held that[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferiorjurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superiorjurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of stare decisis makes no sense.
The decisions of this court are binding upon and must be followed by
all the state courts of California. Decisions of every division of the
District Courts of Appeal are binding upon all the justice and munici-
pal courts and upon all the superior courts of this state, and this is so
whether or not the superior court is acting as a trial or appellate court.
Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 369 P.2d 937,
20 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1962).
75. See note 60, supra.
76. "The policy of the state always has been that the opinion of the jus-
tices, after they are delivered, belong to the public." Nash v. Lathrop, 142
Mass. at 32, 6 N.E. at 561. See also Ex parte Brown, 166 Ind. at 599, 78 N.E.
553 at 559 (1906).
77. 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
78. Id. at 253 (citing Nash).
79. Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. at 31, 6 N.E. at 561.
80. CAL. R. CT. 976(e) (West 1973).




sonable rules the inspection and handling of public records . 2
Summarizing briefly, it may be noted that under the scheme
of selective publication, an opinion which meets the criteria of
Rule 976 may nonetheless remain unpublished; that non-publica-
tion puts in doubt an opinion's value as legal precedent; and that
non-publication may involve a denial of the right of public access
to such cases in general, and a denial of access by the legal profes-
sion in particular. Assuming for the present that an unreported
case like Ball v. Tobelers8 reflects the shortcomings inherent in
selective publication, the availability of remedies to compel publi-
cation is the next consideration.
WRIT OF MANDATE To COMPEL PUBLICATION
One possible remedy to compel publication of unreported
cases in the official reports is the writ of mandate.8 4  For exam-
ple, if a party or an attorney in an unreported case such as Ball
could make a showing that the court had abused its discretion in
applying Rule 976 to the opinion, that no other adequate remedy
is possible, and that a question of public interest is presented, a
writ of mandate should issue to compel the Reporter of Decisions
and the court of appeal to publish the opinion.
Jurisdiction
An action for mandate to compel an appellate court to pub-
lish an opinion would properly lie in the California Supreme
Court, since it has both the jurisdiction 8 and the power 86 to
so order the lower court and the Reporter."
82. Ex parte Brown, 166 Ind. at 599, 78 N.E. at 559 (1906).
83. See note 2, supra.
84. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1085 (West 1967): "[Mandate] may be issued
by any court, . . . to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to
compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty re-
sulting from an office, trust, or station; or to compel the admission of a party to
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled, and from
which he is unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal .. "
The writ of mandate was the remedy sought by Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Musmanno in his attempt to compel that state's reporter of
decisions to include a dissenting opinion in the official reports. The state su-
preme court eventually denied the writ, not because it was an improper remedy,
but on the ground that Justice Musmanno had failed to comply with court rules
and practice. Musmanno v. Eldredge, 382 Pa. 167, 114 A.2d 511 (1955), noted,
24 FORDHAM L. REv. 450 (1955).
85. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (West Supp. 1972): "The Supreme Court,
courts of appeal . . . and their judges have original jurisdiction . . . in proceed-
ings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus . ... "
86. CAL. R. CT. 976(c) (West 1973): "An opinion [not certified for pub-
lication] shall nevertheless be published in the Official Reports upon order of
the Supreme Court to that effect."
87. See generally Fowler, Mandamus as an Original Proceeding in the
California Appellate Courts, 15 HAST. L.J. 177 (1963).
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No Other Adequate Remedy
Once the court of appeal has decided, pursuant to Rule
976,88 that the opinion will not be published, a request for pub-
lication by the proponent should be made by motion, since, in or-
der for a writ of mandate to issue later, it must appear that a re-
quest for relief has been made, unless such a request would have
been futile.89
The existence of a remedy other than mandate will be a
question of fact for the supreme court,00 since this is an original
proceeding. However, even if another remedy would normally
be adequate, which is doubtful here, the overriding factor of pub-
lic interest may influence the court to grant relief in the form of the
writ of mandate."
Abuse of Discretion
Mandate is normally employed to correct the actions of courts
or officers in the performance of their ministerial duties. While
the discretion of a court will not ordinarily be directed by man-
date, "it is not universally true that the writ will not issue to con-
trol such discretion or to require a judicial tribunal to act in a par-
ticular way."" Where it is found that the discretion of a court
could be legally exercised in only one way, mandate will lie to com-
pel the court to so exercise it.9' Mandate thus can be employed
to prevent an abuse of discretion, or to correct arbitrary action
which does not amount to a proper exercise of discretion. 94
When the substance of the holding of Ball v. Tobeler"" is com-
pared to the criteria for publication of Rule 976(b),9' it appears
that there is a prima facie abuse of discretion.
88. Rule 976(c) provides that certification for publication must be made
prior to the decision becoming final in that court.
89. Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 363, 372 P.2d 951 (1950).
90. Ertman v. Municipal Court, 68 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149, 155 P.2d 908,
910 (1945); Carter v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 388, 393, 215 P.2d 491,
493 (1950).
91. See, e.g., Jensen v. McCullough, 94 Cal. App. 382, 392, 271 P. 568, 573(1928), where the issue was construction of a statute of statewide concern.
92. Marr v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 2d 275, 279, 86 P.2d 141, 143
(1939).
93. Id.
94. Id. See also State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.
2d 428, 432, 304 P.2d 13, 15 (1956); Dowell v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 483,
304 P.2d 1009 (1956); Cook v. Superior Court, 240 Cal. App. 2d 880, 884,
50 Cal. Rptr. 81, 83 (1966).
95. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text, supra.
96. See notes 28-32 and accompanying text, supra.
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The first criteria of Rule 976(b) provides that an opinion
may not be published unless it "establishes a new rule of law or
alters or modifies an existing rule."'9 7  Since this includes a "new
construction of a statute," Ball's cause of action for injunctive
relief on the basis of unfair competition arguably applies; for
the court ruled, in a case of first impression, that rental housing was
indeed a business within the meaning of the unfair competition
statute in question.98 The court did not merely apply an existing
legal rule to a new factual situation, but rather "broadened the
scope of legal protection against wrongful business practices gen-
erally" to include the "entire consuming public," in accordance with
the will of the legislature. 99
An even stronger argument for publishability is presented
with regard to the second criterion of 976(b):100 namely, a "legal
issue of continuing public interest." In upholding the cause of
action for declaratory relief, the court noted that "[t]he plight of
the low-income tenant in urban centers has been the subject
of recent law review discussion [citations omitted]."'' Further-
more, the court cited section 33250 of the Health and Safety
Code,102 in which the legislature found that inadequate and un-
sanitary housing is "contrary to the public interest and threatens
the health, safety, welfare, comfort and security of the people of
this state."' 03 In light of these considerations, it is difficult to
imagine an issue of continuing public interest which could better
satisfy Rule 976(b). At the very least, the legal issue in Ball
is of "continuing interest" to such "substantial groups of the pub-
lic" as tenants, landlords, and even legislators.'0°
Finally, to the extent that Ball applied the newly enunciated
concept of implied warranty of habitability,' the opinion cer-
tainly "clarifies a controlling rule of law that is not well estab-
lished,"' 06 and thereby implicitly widens the gap in the exist-
ing common law. By doing so, the court may even be inviting the
97. See note 29, supra.
98. "The conclusion that the renting of housing accommodations of the
magnitude alleged in the complaint is a business cannot reasonably be avoided."
Ball v. Tobeler at 18.
99. Id. at 20.
100. See note 30 and accompanying text, supra.
101. Ball v. Tobeler at 14.
102. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33250 (West 1972).
103. Ball v. Tobeler at 14.
104. Cf., People v. Yellow Cab Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 43, 106 Cal. Rptr. 875
(1973), where the court directed publication since its opinion may be of interest
to "other taxpayers."
105. Hinson v. Delis, 25 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972).
106. See note 31 and accompanying text, supra.
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legislature to codify this new concept,' 07 although it does not ex-
pressly address this point.
Since Ball v. Tobeler apparently meets at least two of the
standards for publication, when only one is required for publica-
tion, it may logically be concluded that the court of appeal abused
its discretion by failing to certify the opinion for publication. 1 8
Standing
Under ordinary circumstances, the petitioner in a mandate
proceeding must show that he has a legal or special interest in
the result, or an exclusive right or interest to be protected. 10 9 How-
ever, the "conditions of petitioner's right and respondent's duty
may be greatly relaxed, if not virtually abandoned, where
the question is one of public interest." 10 This is the rule of Holl-
man v. Warren,"' which held that
[w]here the question is one of public right and the object of
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty,
the relator need not show that he has any legal or special in-
terest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as
a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in ques-
tion enforced.112
Petitioners for a writ of mandate may therefore be granted stand-
ing in their general capacities as citizens and taxpayers," 8 in
addition to standing based upon a personal interest in the out-
come.
In the present example, therefore, even though an attorney
seeking to force the publication of an opinion may not be able
to demonstrate an exclusive personal right, he may allege that he
is acting both as a citizen and an attorney to ensure compliance
with Rule 976. In both capacities, he is representing the public
interest in promoting the right of access to judicial opinions, 1 4
107. See note 32 and accompanying text, supra.
108. It should be noted at this point that the California Supreme Court de-
nied the petition for a hearing in Ball v. Tobeler on November 9, 1972. There-
fore, Rule 976(d) (which provides that "no opinion superseded by the grant-
ing of a hearing, rehearing, or other judicial action shall be published in the
Official Reports") does not bar the publication of this opinion.
109. See generally 52 AM. JuR. 2d Mandamus § 390 (1970).
110. 5 B. WrrgiN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE (2d ed.), Extraordinary Writs
§ 69, at 3847 (1971).
111. 32 Cal. 2d 351, 196 P.2d 562 (1948).
112. Id. at 357, 196 P.2d at 566. See also Kappadahl v. Alcan Pac. Co.,
222 Cal. App. 2d 626, 643, 35 Cal. Rptr. 354, 365 (1963).
113. Trickey v. City of Los Angeles, 101 Cal. App. 2d 871, 226 P.2d 694
(1951); Knoff v. San Francisco, I Cal. App. 3d 184, 81 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1969);
Pitts v. Perluss, 58 Cal. 2d 824, 377 P.2d 83, 27 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1962); Diaz v.
Quitoriano, 268 Cal. App. 2d 807, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1969).




and in seeking a more uniform application115 of Rule 976 to the
certification process.
The maxim that mandate will not issue to enforce an abstract
right of no practical benefit to the petitioner is no bar here. In
Diaz v. Quitoriano,"6 the petitioner sought a writ of mandate
to compel welfare workers to advise all persons requesting aid of
the right to make a written application and of the right to appeal
a denial of an application. Petitioner obviously knew of these
rights himself, and therefore mandate would be of no practical
value to him personally. Yet, "where the problem presented and
the principle involved are of great public interest, the courts have
deemed it appropriate to entertain the proceedings rather than to
dismiss the same as being moot.""' 7  In other words, as a matter
of public interest, the question was not moot, and the petitioner pre-
vailed as a citizen interested in procuring the enforcement of a
public duty.
Similarly, even though an attorney may personally have ac-
cess to an unpublished opinion, he should be able to obtain a
writ of mandate, because: 1) as an attorney and a citizen, he
may assert the right of public access to judicial opinions, which is
a matter of public interest; 2) he has an interest in both capacities
in the uniform administration of Rule 976; 3) there has been an
abuse of judicial discretion in applying the standards of Rule 976;
and 4) he is not asserting a mere "abstract right of no practical
benefit," since the precedent value of the case will undoubtedly
be enhanced if it is officially published-a fact of special impor-
tance to an attorney who argues the case on appeal, or who may
have occasion to cite it in subsequent litigation.
CONCLUSION
Although the writ of mandate may be a sufficient remedy
to compel the publication of an occasionally worthy opinion which
the judges fail to certify, as a practical matter it cannot solve
the overall problem of the non-uniformity of judicial applica-
tion of Rule 976. If mandate were regularly sought for that pur-
pose, it would only serve to clog the already overburdened judi-
ciary, and alienate many judges. Additionally, it would place
the burden of compelling publication on a few attorneys in
each case. If they were unwilling to assume that burden or did not
115. See Knoff v. San Francisco, 1 Cal. App. 3d 184, 198, 81 Cal. Rptr. 683,
691 (1969).
116. 268 Cal. App. 2d 807, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1969).
117. Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 877, 484 P.2d 1345, 1347, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 3 (1971).
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recognize the value of the decision to other practitioners, the
problem would remain.
One solution is to remove from the judges the discretion
to decide which opinions should be published. This would re-
lieve the courts of one more essentially non-judicial function,
and allow them to devote more time to the actual resolution of
cases.
After court decisions become final, the written opinions
could be submitted to an independent statewide or district-wide
panel composed of members of the Bar, legal scholars, or per-
haps retired jurists. This panel would screen the written opin-
ions, independent of the biases of their authors, and decide which
merit publication under Rule 976. Alternatively, such a panel
could review the determination of the judges concerning an opin-
ion's publishability, operating in a manner analogous to the su-
preme court clerks who screen petitions before recommending to
the justices whether or not a hearing should be granted. Such a
system would maintain the goals of selective publication, and
eliminate the present disparity of publication standards between
the appellate districts, thus ensuring that significant cases are
published, while those of no consequence are not.
Selective publication of written judicial opinions is a desir-
able means of limiting the volume of cases officially published
for the use of the legal profession. However, if such a system is
applied in an improper manner, otherwise worthy cases may not be
published, thereby depriving the legal profession and the gen-
eral public of the right to access to the law. At the same time,
the precedent value of such cases is rendered questionable at best.
The writ of mandate may be employed in individual cases to
compel the publication of opinions which meet the standards.
However, this is a rather piecemeal remedy. A better overall
solution may lie in the creation of an independent panel or office
which could exercise the discretion now vested in the courts
themselves.
Richard M. Hluchan
[Vol. 13
